Language-game

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A language-game (German: Sprachspiel) is a philosophical concept developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein, referring to simple examples of language use and the actions into which the language is woven.

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[edit] Description

In his work, Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein regularly referred to the concept of language games.[1] Wittgenstein rejected the idea that language has a direct connection to reality and argued that concepts do not need to be so clearly defined to be meaningful.[2] Wittgenstein used the term "language-game" to designate forms of language simpler than the entirety of a language itself, "consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven" (PI 7), and connected by family resemblance (Familienähnlichkeit). The concept was intended "to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of life" (PI 23).

The term 'language game' is used to refer to:

  • Fictional examples of language use that are simpler than our own everyday language. (e.g. PI 2)
  • Simple uses of language with which children are first taught language (training in language).
  • Specific regions of our language with their own grammars and relations to other language-games.
  • All of a natural language seen as comprising a family of language-games.

These meanings are not separated from each other by sharp boundaries, but blend into one another (as suggested by the idea of family resemblance). The concept is based on the following analogy: The rules of language are analogous to the rules of games; thus saying something in a language is analogous to making a move in a game. The analogy between a language and a game brings out the fact that only in the various and multiform activities of human life do words have meaning. (The concept is not meant to suggest that there is anything trivial about language, or that language is 'just a game', quite the contrary.)

[edit] Examples

The classic example of a language-game is the so-called "builder's language" introduced in §2 of the Philosophical Investigations:

The language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A is building with building-stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones, in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words "block", "pillar" "slab", "beam". A calls them out; — B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call. Conceive this as a complete primitive language. (PI 2.)[3]

Later "this" and "there" are added (with functions analogous to the function these words have in natural language), and "a, b, c, d" as numerals. An example of its use: builder A says "d — slab — there" and points, and builder B counts four slabs, "a, b, c, d..." and moves them to the place pointed to by A. The builder's language is an activity into which is woven something we would recognize as language, but in a simpler form. This language-game resembles the simple forms of language taught to children, and Wittgenstein asks that we conceive of it as "a complete primitive language" for a tribe of builders.

[edit] Postmodernist interpretation

Jean-François Lyotard explicitly drew upon Wittgenstein's concept of language-games in developing his own notion of metanarratives in The Postmodern Condition. However, Wittgenstein's concept is, from its inception, of a plurality of language games; their plurality is not taken to be a feature solely of contemporary discourse. Lyotard's discussion is primarily applied in the contexts of authority, power and legitimation, where Wittgenstein's is concerned to mark distinctions between a wide range of activities in which language users engage.

Subsequent postmodern philosophy has taken up this notion of language-games, leading Richard Dawkins to comment that[4]

But don't the postmodernists claim only to be 'playing games'? Isn't it the whole point of their philosophy that anything goes, there is no absolute truth, anything written has the same status as anything else, no point of view is privileged? Given their own standards of relative truth, isn't it rather unfair to take them to task for fooling around with word-games, and playing little jokes on readers? Perhaps, but one is then left wondering why their writings are so stupefyingly boring. (...) More tellingly, if they are only joking around, why do they react with such shrieks of dismay when somebody plays a joke at their expense.

[edit] References

  1. ^ Biletzki, Anat (8 November, 2002; substantive revision 23 December, 2009). "Ludwig Wittgenstein". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved April 04, 2012. 
  2. ^ Jago 2007, p. 55
  3. ^ http://www.voidspace.org.uk/psychology/wittgenstein/one.shtml
  4. ^ Richard Dawkins (1998/2007). Postmodernism disrobed. Retrieved 30 March 2013. Originally published in Nature 394:141–143. Review of Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont's Intellectual Impostures

[edit] Bibliography

  • Jago, Mark (2007). Wittgenstein. Humanities-Ebooks. 
  • Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953). Philosophical Investigations. Blackwell. 
  • Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1942). Blue and Brown Books. Harper Perennial. 

[edit] See also